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GERMANY

Mathias Rohe

1Muslim Populations

The presence of considerable numbers of Muslims in Germany is a relatively new phenomenon, as compared to the UK or France. Since the 1960s, thousands of so-called “Gastarbeiter” (guest workers) were attracted to work in Germany with many of them being Turkish nationals, followed by people from the Balkan region (mainly Yugoslavia and Albania). Therefore, in sum, Islamic life in Germany is very much of a Turkish and also Balkan character. Besides that, there was a continuous immigration of often well-educated people from the Middle East and beyond (physicians, engineers etc. mainly from Syria, Lebanon, Iran and Afghanistan), but of a limited number. A third motivation of Muslim immigration to the country was the search for asylum. Their countries of origin are mainly to be found in the Middle East, the Indian Subcontinent and Northern Africa. In addition to that, there are Muslim merchants, students and scientists living in the country for a shorter or longer period.

The majority of the Muslims in Germany belong to the Sunni denomination (74.1%), but there are also significant groups of Twelver Shi’is (7.1% of Iranian, Lebanese and Iraqi origins) which may reach 200,000 persons as well as an estimated number of 500,000 Alevi’s (12.7% of total number of Muslims) mostly from Turkey and some 30,000 Ahmadis (1.7%) from Pakistan, the oldest organised Muslim group in Germany.2 As everywhere

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2 Federal Office for Migration and Refugees/Deutsche Islam Konferenz, Muslim Life in Germany, Nuremberg 2009, p. 92; cf. www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/Publikationen/Forschungsberichte/fbo6-muslimisches-leben.pdf?__blob=publicationFile, accessed 23 December 2012. This study is by far the most reliable one in Germany, based on 6,004 interviewed persons. For methodological issues cf. ibid., p. 34.
in the world, their opinions and beliefs range from a very devout attitude to a mere cultural link to Islam; Sufism is widespread especially among ethnic Turks.

Most immigrants initially planned to stay in Germany only for a few years, to earn some money for a better existence in their home country or to find a temporary refuge until the political situation in the country of origin improved. German legislation and administration tended to share these expectations. Therefore Muslims—except for the relatively small number of German converts to Islam—behaved and were treated as temporary guests. After half a century, Muslims realised that their initial intention to return to the country of origin sooner or later turned out to be a mere illusion. The same is true for German society as a whole: legislation and government now have to cope with a stable and significant group of Muslims as a part of German society.

There are no official statistics regarding the religious affiliation of the German population. According to figures based on representative polls published in June 2009 by the Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees and the German Islam Conference, there are between 3.8 and 4.3 million Muslims living in the country; 29% of them were born in Germany. About 2 million Muslims in the country are German citizens. Most of the Muslims—German and foreign citizens—are of Turkish origin (c. 2.5 million), more than half a million from former Yugoslavia, over 300,000 from the Middle East (mainly from Iraq and Lebanon), around 300,000 from North Africa, 60,000 from other parts of Africa, around 180,000 from South/Southeast Asia and 70,000 from Iran. The number of German converts is unknown; according to a rough estimate it can be anywhere between 10,000 and 100,000. As a result of the migration history of many Muslims in Germany, there is a concentration in the main industrial areas in Western Germany (Northrhine-Westphalia, Rhine-Main-region, regions of Stuttgart, Munich, Nuremberg, Hamburg) and in Berlin.

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3 The figure was recently changed to 2.9 million due to a new statistical approach: Children born in Germany from two parents of the same foreign nationality are now attributed to this nationality; cf. the statistics of the 2011 census published by the Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden 2011, Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit, p. 56, https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/Bevoelkerung/MigrationIntegration/Migrationshintergrund2010201104.pdf?__blob=publicationFile, accessed 10 January 2013.

Secularity is the leading principle regulating the relationship between the state and religion, which means individual and collective freedom of religion, religious neutrality of the state and the separation between state and religion. In Germany a system of secularity accepting of religions prevails. All religious communities enjoy far-reaching rights to act in the public space and to participate in and cooperate with the state on various levels. The underlying idea is that the secular state alone is unable to guarantee the principles it is based on, and that religion may positively contribute to this basis. These principles are common in Germany as a whole. Nevertheless, Germany being a federal state consisting of 16 states (**Länder**), the role of religion in the public sphere is slightly different from state to state. While the most important legislative competence lies at the federal level, the states are in general responsible for administrative affairs. In addition to that, they have prime legislative responsibility in educational, cultural and police issues. Thus, in daily practice the states are usually the key actors in cooperating with Muslim communities on the ground.

Some laws do differentiate between legally recognised/registered religious communities, others do not. In many cases it is sufficient to be registered as an association under private law, which is easily achieved and this is the case for most of the Muslim organisations, in particular those running mosques and Islamic cultural centres. The prerequisites for being recognised as a religious community according to the laws regulating the cooperation between the state and such communities vary greatly. They are linked to the respective importance of the issue at stake for the state.

Article 140 of the Federal Constitution regulates the conditions for religious societies (communities) to apply for the status of a corporation under public law (**Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts**). Those communities holding this status when the constitution came into force kept their status. Others may apply for it and shall be granted the same rights, if their by-laws and the number of their members give assurances of permanency. The state administrations would usually grant status in cases when an organisation has already existed for 30 years and represents at least 0.1% of the state’s population (membership has to be clearly regulated), but exceptions and reduced requirements can be applied for from case to case. This status grants far-reaching rights and privileges, e.g. tax exemptions and access to state institutions for collecting taxes (against payment), rights to have members appointed to broadcast advisory boards and to cooperate in matters of youth, social care, the right of refusing
testimony in court for those carrying out pastoral care, rights to regulate labour relations and the relations to members including internal jurisdiction, and more. No Muslim organisation has obtained this status so far.

On the federal level, in 2006 the Ministry of the Interior established the Deutsche Islam Konferenz (DIK, German Islam Conference) to bring forward a more structured dialogue between Muslims and the state on crucial issues. There was a plenum consisting of 15 representatives of the state (federal, state and communal level) and of 15 Muslim representatives. The latter were chosen by the Ministry; five of them represented the major organisations, the rest were prominent individuals covering different sectors of society. Since the beginning, this choice has (naturally) been disputed by Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

After the 2009 elections, the Ministry decided to continue the DIK in a somewhat different setting. The main objectives defined by the Ministry are integration, social cohesion and resolving security problems through long-term dialogue and cooperation. Only three out of five major Muslim organisations are still members of the new DIK: DITIB, VIKZ and the AABF, in addition to the Bosnian (Islamische Gemeinschaft der Bosniaken in Deutschland, Islamic Community of the Bosniaks in Germany, IGBD, www.igbd.eu) and the Moroccan (Zentralrat der Marokkaner in Deutschland, Central Council of the Moroccans in Germany)7 communities. The Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland (Turkish Community in Germany, TGD, www.tgd.de/), was invited to participate in spite of being an immigrant rather than a religious organisation. Ten prominent Muslim individuals, who are not identical with those having participated in the first DIK, were chosen to represent Muslim plurality. The former fixed working groups were replaced by more flexible and concentrated project groups preparing the work of the “plenary”. The first group working on imam training8 finished its work in early 2011. Other groups have continued their work on anti-Muslim prejudice, Islamist extremism and anti-Semitism, understanding of gender roles in Muslim milieus and on better integration of Muslims into the labour market.9

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7 No website could be found.
8 The author was the only external member from German universities.
9 The brochure “Bessere Integration von Musliminnen und Muslimen in den Arbeitsmarkt” is available at www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DIK/DE/
At the state level, several “round tables” have been established in Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate to promote concrete projects, in particular regarding pilot projects of Islamic instruction in public schools and Muslim burials. In most of the states, only some of the existing major organisations are involved; in some cases, local Muslim initiatives are accepted as preliminary partners for cooperation.

In 2012, for the first time, a Muslim (Ilhan Ilkilic) was appointed as a member of the Deutscher Ethikrat, an ethical advisory council for the Federal Parliament and Government.11

3 MAIN MUSLIM ORGANISATIONS

The vast majority of Muslim organisations act at a local level, running mosques in particular. Usually they are organised as associations under civil law. In some states, regional organisations have emerged in recent years. On the federal level, the major (umbrella) organisations are the following:

- **Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği DITIB (Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion, Turkish-Islamic Union of the Institution for Religious Affairs)** (Subbelrather Strasse 17, 50823 Köln; Internet: www.ditib.de, E-Mail: info@ditib.de). At the moment DITIB is establishing sub-organisations on the state level. It is by far the largest organisation, running nearly 900 mosques all over the country.

- **Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren VIKZ (Union of Islamic Cultural Centres)** (Vogelsanger Strasse 290, 50825 Köln; Internet: www.vikz.de; E-Mail: info@vikz.de). The VIKZ has 300 local member communities with more than half of them owning their premises.
– *Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany) (Osterather Strasse 7, 50739 Köln, Internet: www.islamrat.de; E-Mail: via the “contact” icon on the website). Its most important member is Milli Görüş, which is under surveillance by several German services for the protection of the Constitution.

– *Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland* ZMD (Central Council of Muslims in Germany) (Steinfelder Gasse 32, 50670 Köln, Internet: www.zentralrat.de; E-Mail: sekretariat@zentralrat.de). This is an umbrella organisation of 19 other umbrella organisations, most of them having relatively few members. Some significant member organisations, like the *Islamische Gemeinde Deutschland* (IGD Islamic Community of Germany) which is close to the Muslim Brotherhood ideologically, are under surveillance by services for the protection of the Constitution. In 2002, the ZMD published an Islamic Charta defining its positions towards the German state and society (an English version is available at http://zentralrat.de/3037.php).

These four organisations are loosely united in the *Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland* (KRM, Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany). It was created parallel to the establishment of the German Islam Conference, attempting to create a unified cooperation partner for the German administration. Nevertheless, the member organisations are far from being united in their interests and goals. DITIB enjoys a veto right within the Council. The KRM does not have any infrastructure like a website etc. News is usually published by the websites of the member organisations. The KRM is also split regarding the participation in the DIK (cf. 2. above).

The extent to which these organisations are representative of Muslims in Germany is highly disputed. Whereas the government usually would count 15–20% of Muslims to be represented by them, they claim to represent the vast majority of practising Muslims.

The *Alevitische Gemeinde Deutschlands, Avrupa Alevi Birlikleri Konfederasyonu*, (Alevi Community of Germany), AABF (Stolberger Strasse 317, 50933 Köln; www.alevi.com; info@alevi.com) is a federal umbrella organisation for local and regional Alevi communities. The AABF is the only organisation within the spectrum of Islam so far which has been recognised by the state as meeting the legal requirements of a religious community in the sense of article 7 section 3 of the German Constitution. It is thus able to co-operate with the state in establishing religious instruction in public schools according to the legal system prevailing in most of the states except Berlin and Bremen.
In March 2009, 110 Shi’i communities created an umbrella organisation called *Islamische Gemeinschaft der schiitischen Gemeinschaften Deutschlands* (Islamic Community of the German Shi’i communities; www.igs-de.de; info@igs-de.de).

For the Ahmadis, the *Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat* is a federal umbrella organisation based in Frankfurt/Main (Zentrale der AJM, Genfer Strasse 11, 60437 Frankfurt am Main; www.ahmadiyya.de; kontakt@ahmadiyya.de).

In 2012, the *Liberal-Islamischer Bund* (Liberal Islamic Union; www.lib-ev.de; info@lib-ev.) was founded by mostly Muslim intellectuals.

As a first attempt in Germany, an openly Muslim political party (*Muslimisch Demokratische Union*) has participated in municipal elections in Osnabrück, in September 2011, but failed to win seats in the city council.13 No such group was successful in 2012 either.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Approximately 2,700 buildings are used as mosques, in addition to an unknown number of Alevi cem houses, probably amounting to several hundred.14 While most of them are established in buildings not originally intended for that purpose, such as former factory buildings etc., some 200 are shaped in more or less traditional mosque architecture, and another estimated 150 of this type are under construction.15 Muslim religious infrastructure is now widespread, but still concentrated in the major industrial settlement areas linked to immigration processes in the past (see section 1 above). Many of them still follow ethnic attributions (e.g. the “Turkish,” “Arab”/“Moroccan,” “Bosnian,” “Albanian,” or “Pakistani” mosque) and are run and visited mainly only by those familiar with the respective language. But there are remarkable changes indicating increasing “domestication” in the sense of de-nationalisation of Muslim community life among the

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13 For the results cf. the official announcement, available at http://wahlen.itebo.de/komw2011/STOS_Kommunalwahl2011/404000_000017/, accessed 30 April 2012; the MDU won 0.84% of the total vote.
third or even fourth generation of former immigrants. The establishment of mosques and prayer houses is one of the elements of religious freedom guaranteed by Article 4 of the Constitution and implemented by court decisions as the need arises. Unlike in Switzerland, it would be impossible in Germany to suppress the constitutional rights of a minority by a democratic majority decision. Contrary to the legal situation, the heated debate on "Muslim integration" in Germany (see section 15 below) has shown that according to representative polls in 2010, 58.4% of the German population agrees to considerably restrict the religious freedom of Muslims in the country, whatever that exactly might mean.

Generally, in the public debate the mosque has replaced the head scarf as a core issue of potential conflict between Muslims and parts of the broader society. Particularly projects of major mosques in Cologne, Berlin, Frankfurt and Munich have triggered protests by strange coalitions of extreme right-wing enemies of Islam, small groups of Christian fundamentalists and (former) left-wing personalities like Ralph Giordano, all of them denouncing “Islam as such” to be a problem for German society. In some places (e.g. in the northern town of Rendsburg), initiatives to use loudspeakers for the prayer call have created tensions in the neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, there is a very broad political majority supporting strongly and publicly the constitutional rights of Muslims. The Deutsche Islam Konferenz (see section 2) issued a paper on the relevant legal framework including advice on how practically to solve potential conflicts on mosque building.


Prayer or meditation rooms are available in a number of public institutions, e.g. in state parliament buildings or public hospitals. Due to the religious neutrality of the state, they are not confined to particular religions or confessions and usually called "room of silence." In most public buildings, however, there are no such facilities available.

5 Children’s Education

Article 7, Section 3 of the German Constitution, which is valid in all federal states except Bremen and Berlin (for historical reasons, cf. Article 141 “Bremen clause”), declares confessional religious instruction to be a regular subject in public schools.\(^{20}\) It has to be taught in cooperation between the state and the respective religious community. Since 2008–9, the Alevi community has been recognised by several federal states (North-Rhine Westphalia, Hesse, Bavaria) to have a structure which enables it to cooperate with the state in this manner.\(^{21}\) In the state of Berlin, Islamic religious instruction, including Alevi, has been established since the beginning of this decade. The state of Hamburg has introduced an inter-confessional model of "religion for all" under the oversight of the Protestant Church.

Attaining recognition as a religious community in terms of school law is a major goal of the main existing Muslim organisations on both the federal and the regional levels. Since 2003, a number of federal states (North Rhine-Westphalia, Bavaria, Lower Saxony, Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate) have introduced pilot projects of Islamic instruction. The nature of such cooperation is very dependent on the particular state’s practices and expectations, but in all cases Muslims are intensely involved in elaborating the curricula and appointing the teachers. In 2008 the Deutsche Islam Konferenz published a detailed paper\(^{22}\) identifying


these topics and suggesting solutions. In 2009, the state of Bavaria established Islamic instruction on a state-wide level according to the model developed in the city of Erlangen in close cooperation with the Ministry of Education, the Islamic Community of Erlangen and the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg. This model includes now more than 270 schools of all educational levels, reaching around 13% of all Muslim pupils within the state. In late 2011, Northrhine-Westphalia has introduced a new temporary law operating until 2019, according to which confessional Islamic instruction is introduced in ca. 130 public schools in cooperation with the KRM (cf. section 3 above). The KRM is entitled to send four representatives to the relevant advisory board (Beirat), whereas the Ministry of Education nominated another four in accordance with the KRM. Lower Saxony has equally established a model of cooperation with a Muslim council consisting of DITIB and the Schura Niedersachsen in 2012; new classes are planned to start in 2013.

Applications of Muslim pupils for exemption from obligatory classes in swimming where these have been mixed sex have gone to court. According to a landmark decision of 1994 by the Federal Administrative Court, they are entitled to such exemption if they have reached the age of puberty and the school is unable to arrange unisex classes. Now, more and more courts tend to give superior weight to the educational purposes of the school over possibly conflicting religious needs. This is particularly the case concerning younger pupils. Equally, two older pupils (one male and one female) failed to obtain exemptions based on religious conflicts if they were confronted with other swimmers of the opposite or same sex

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in light bath dresses. The Administrative Court of Appeals of Hessen\textsuperscript{27} and the Administrative Court of Cologne\textsuperscript{28} held that this kind of interaction is an inevitable part of life in Germany inside and outside swimming halls. The courts affirmed the right to gender-segregated rooms for changing clothes and pointed to the possibility for the girl to wear a “burkini,” but held that the state’s duty to grant education prevails over the claimant’s objections.

Regarding ritual prayer, the protection of religious freedom includes public schools, and that there is no objection in principle to perform the prayers the way the appellant wanted to. Nevertheless, these rights are limited by the equally legitimate goal to preserve school peace. Meanwhile, the administration has issued instructions on how to handle the situation by minimising possible conflicts.\textsuperscript{29}

The establishment of private religious schools is granted under Article 7, Sections 4 and 5\textsuperscript{30} of the Constitution. Several such schools have been established in recent years by organisations close to the Fethullah Gülen movement.

6 ISLAM IN HIGHER AND PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION

The Universities of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Münster and Osnabrück have established programmes to train Muslim teachers and appointed Muslim professors as core staff members since 2003. Some first teaching materials have been developed and published,\textsuperscript{31} triggering a vivid debate on modern Muslim religious pedagogy among traditionalist Muslims. The legal issues involved are similar to those mentioned above (see section 5).

\textsuperscript{27} Judgment from 28.09.2012, NVwZ 013, 159.
\textsuperscript{28} Decision from 20.11.2012 (Az 10 L 1400/12), BeckRS 2012, 60246, accessed 30 January 2013.
\textsuperscript{29} Decision from 30 November 2011, available at www.bverwg.de/enid/8997196639dd22f01a6d558875f91f151e10655f76696577092d096465746f696c093a096d65746f6e72092d0932383093095f7472636964092d93133333431/Entscheidungen/Entscheidung_8n.html, accessed 30 April 2012. In the case at stake the Court of Appeal’s factual findings stating considerable conflicts were binding for the Federal Administrative Court, thus the pupil lost his case.
\textsuperscript{31} Lamya Kaddor/Rabeya Müller/Harun Behr (eds.), Saphir 5/6, Religionsbuch für junge Musliminnen und Muslime (Munich: Kösel, 2008); Serap Erkan et al. (eds.), Mein Islambuch (Munich: Oldenbourg 2009).
In a broader academic perspective, Islamic theology (called “Islamic studies,” “Islamic religious studies” or “Islamic theology”) aiming at a confession-orientated education and research are established in a small number of universities. In Frankfurt/Main, the Turkish Republic has started financing three professorships for such purposes. Following the recommendations published by the German Wissenschaftsrat (German Council of Science and Humanities), the universities of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Frankfurt and Giessen (joint planning), Münster and Osnabrück (joint planning) and Tübingen have established departments for such studies in close cooperation with existing theology faculties and with Muslim representatives gathered in advisory boards according to the German legal system of cooperation in such fields. Tübingen started its study programme in Fall 2011, whereas Erlangen-Nürnberg, Frankfurt/Giessen and Münster/Osnabrück started in 2012 by appointing professors, establishing post-doc research groups and courses (BA/MA). Some more or less anti-Muslim movements are heavily criticising these developments, but the programmes enjoy broad political support.

Concerning imam training, the University of Osnabrück started a residential programme for 30 imams in 2010; the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg has developed teaching programs in a more decentralised way in cooperation with the local levels. Some Muslim organisations train their imams in internal programmes. State-funded political organisations and a number of bigger cities like Munich, Frankfurt and Berlin have offered programmes for imams as well, in particular concerning citizenship issues, which have been evaluated and used in the new DIK project group (see section 2 above). There is a widespread desire among Muslims to pro-

39 Cf. e.g. statements of the so-called Central council of ex-Muslims in Germany, at www.bild.de/BILD/politik/2010/10/14/imam-ausbildung-ein-skandal/sagt-der-zentral-rat-der-ex-muslime.html.
fessionalise the training of imams, since their role in majority societies as well as broad political support is increasing; but in terms of organisation and particularly financing, no solutions are in sight for the near future.

The VIKZ has offered imam training courses since the 1980s. DITIB has run several training programmes in cooperation with German state institutions related to language skills and integration issues. The Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat opened an institute for imam education (Institute for Islamic Theology and Languages) in Riedstadt/Hessen in December 2012. Approximately half of the Ahmadiyya community members in Germany live in the Rhine-Main region close to this institution (ca. 15,000).

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Many Muslims still prefer to be buried in their country of origin. This is due to sentiments of “feeling home” there more than in Germany, particularly within the first generation of immigrants, but also due to relatively high costs for burials in Germany and the lack of appropriate facilities for Muslim burials in their neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, an increasing number of Muslims are buried in Germany. There are only a few Muslim cemeteries, but many cemeteries run by the state or by churches have established special Muslim burial areas. Facilities for washing the deceased’s body have been built, and the possibilities of maintaining a grave for more than the usually permitted period of 10–20 years are broadened (while costly). In addition, there is an increasing consensus that graves could be re-used, provided that the still existing mortal remains are buried in a lower stratum of the grave, like in many heavily populated regions in the Muslim world. From a legal point of view, most states require the status of a corporation under public law (Körperschaft des Öffentlichen Rechts, see section 2) as a prerequisite for establishing a religious cemetery, which is difficult to obtain. Northrhine-Westphalia has lowered these very strict and thus potentially unconstitutional prerequisites. Other legislation has abolished the duty to bury bodies in a coffin, thus allowing the traditional burial in white linen. A debate on reform suggestions submitted by two opposition

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parties took place in the Parliament of Hessen on 8 November 2012. On 4 December 2012 the governing parties proposed a legal amendment allowing burials without a coffin according to Islamic tradition, which is likely to come into force in March 2013. In Baden-Württemberg, all political parties represented in the State Parliament agreed on a similar initiative in the aftermath of a parliamentarian hearing in October 2012.

8 “Chaplaincy” in State Institutions

Chaplaincy in state institutions is run in cooperation between the state and the recognised religious communities to fulfil the necessary organisational conditions. No Muslim organisation has achieved this status so far. Until now, there are only provisional solutions on a local level, particularly in hospitals. The city of Wiesbaden has started a model project funded by the EU on offering spiritual care and educating suitable volunteers in the main hospital and in the local prison with considerable success. The legal basis for that is an “integration agreement” between the municipality and most of the local Muslim organisations (the local DITIB branch was prevented from doing so by the central administration in Cologne for unclear reasons). Other cities like Augsburg and Nürnberg will follow.

Regarding Muslim chaplaincy in the German army, the Ministry of Defence has responded to a letter by the Intercultural Council (Interkultureler Rat) that two prerequisites would have to be met for a Muslim chaplain to be appointed: first, a minimum number of 1,500 Muslim soldiers has to be registered, and, second, a Muslim cooperation partner recognised by a concordate (Staatsvertrag) has to be found; both requirements have not been met yet, while alternative solutions have been rejected.

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9 Religious Festivals

Political authorities increasingly take notice of Muslim religious festivals, sending messages of congratulation or inviting them/accepting invitations, e.g. in the month of Ramadan. Muslim holidays are not legally recognised as state holidays like the major Christian holidays but are legally protected to a certain extent. Employees are in general entitled to apply for leave during the major festivals, pupils may stay away from school for a number of days (during the ‘Id al-Adha and following the end of the month of Ramadan, ‘Id al-Fitr). The numbers of pilgrims on the annual hajj are unknown.

A Shi’i ‘Ashura procession was held in 2012 in the town of Vechta in Lower Saxony with 300 participants, seemingly without objections by the overwhelming Catholic majority.47

10 Halal Products and Islamic Services

Halal food can be imported to Germany, which regularly occurs. According to a verdict of the Federal Constitutional Court in 2002,48 Muslims are entitled to apply for an exemption from the general prohibition of slaughtering without pre-stunning according to the Animal Protection Act (Para. 4a Sect. 2). Since then, some Muslim butchers have applied for such exceptions, which were often refused by administrations or only granted under very restrictive conditions. The Federal Administrative Court has repeatedly decided in favour of Muslim applicants49 but administrative and lower court resistance has not totally ceased yet. In September 2009, the Federal Constitutional Court50 in an unusually clear judgement quashed decisions by the Administrative Court of Giessen51 and the

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48 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vol. 104, pp. 337.
Administrative Court of Appeals of Hessen\textsuperscript{52} which were unfavourable for the Muslim applicant. Nevertheless, in a questionable decision of November 2009, the Bavarian Administrative Court of Appeals\textsuperscript{53} stated that the claim of a Muslim applicant to slaughter animals for ‘Id al-Adha was taken to be merely culturally based, thus not coming under freedom of religion. Repeated reports confirm that local administrations are handling exemption applications in a very restrictive manner.\textsuperscript{54}

DITIB has called on believers to avoid unnecessary pain for the animals to be slaughtered at ‘Id al-Adha, declaring that there is no objection to using electric stunning methods before slaughtering the animal.\textsuperscript{55}

In public and social care institutions food not containing pork or alcohol is usually offered. In some cases (e.g. kindergartens with high numbers of Muslim children) there are complaints that no traditional pork meals are offered any more.\textsuperscript{56}

Access to halal food is widespread, since more and more shops, restaurants and supermarkets offer it mainly in the regions with dense Muslim population. Regarding Islamic banking and finance, there are no institutions specialised on this sector. Instead, a number of banks and finance services offer sukuk and other forms of Islamic investments, or interest-free accounts. Only in Mannheim (Baden-Württemberg), the Kuveyt Türk bank opened a branch in 2010 and applied for a full banking licence in 2012.\textsuperscript{57} The market for such activities in Germany is considered to be marginal. In Berlin, a “Muslimtaxi” company was set up in December 2011 offering transport by same-sex drivers, and a Muslim auction company was opened.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{52} Decision from 26 May 2009 (unpublished).
\textsuperscript{54} Cf. e.g. “Streit ums Schächten. Schlachten mit der Stoppuhr”, Frankfurter Rundschau 02.08.2012, available at www.fr-online.de/rhein-main/streit-ums-schaechten-schlachten-mit-stoppuhr,1472796,16779062.html.
In addition, some mosques and organisations are offering services ranging from hajj performance to the organisation of Muslim burials. Internet offers for sales and services seem to cover a considerable part of supply from books, DVDs etc. up to religious garment etc.

11 Dress Codes

Male Muslim dress codes are practically unnoticed by law and by public debate. The contrary is true for the female head scarf. There is a widespread rejection of the head scarf in German society, perceiving it simply as an instrument to oppress women and demonstrate male supremacy. Extremists including anti-Islam feminists like Alice Schwarzer declared it to be “the flag of Islamism”, not distinguishing between actual cases of oppression and women wearing the head scarf voluntarily.

Legally, wearing the head scarf is allowed in public space including schools and universities, except for school teachers according to newer legislation in eight federal states which have banned the wearing of “religious symbols” in public office. Such regulations are neutral in their wording but are clearly aimed at the Muslim head scarf only. In Baden-Württemberg, nursery staff is also targeted. The states of Hessen and Berlin have gone even further including practically all state officers. Berlin has banned all kinds of religious symbols (including Christian and Jewish ones). The Federal Constitutional Court has opened for two ways of legislation: either a general ban of religious symbols or a general permission. It has stressed that in any case all religions have to be treated equally. In contrast to that, the respective laws of some states include exceptions of the ban for culturally accepted (Christian or Jewish) symbols, which is a clear contradiction of the Constitutional Court’s verdict which enjoys legal status according to German law.

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59 Cf. for such cases the judgement of the Administrative Court of Karlsruhe (Az. 9 K 4270/07) from 30 April 2009 (residence permit for a shortly married Serbian woman who was forced to wear a headscarf by her Turkish husband who had unofficially entered into a polygamous marriage besides that).


Federal Administrative Court\textsuperscript{63} has declared the respective law of Baden-Württemberg to meet the constitutional requirements, but stressed that symbols of other religions have then to be equally banned. In the states having banned head scarves, the courts have now to enter into bizarre reflections on whether caps or wigs are to be considered as headscarves or not in a legal sense.\textsuperscript{64} The Constitutional Court will have to decide again following the Baden-Württemberg teacher’s appeal against the judgement of the Federal Administrative Court.

Since 2010 the debate on the “burqa ban” in France, Belgium and elsewhere had certain repercussions in the German public debate, including an expert hearing on the freedom of religion\textsuperscript{65} in the Committee on Human Rights of the Federal Parliament in October 2010. Nevertheless, except for some single voices, a broad political majority from left to right, including the President and the Federal Government, refuse to take specific measures for a ban of the burka or the niqab worn voluntarily. The existing laws relating to security measures (controls etc.) and to work in public institutions like schools are taken to be sufficient. A total ban without any specific reasons is held unconstitutional by the vast majority in the Parliament and broader politics.

Photos of women wearing a headscarf for ID cards or passports are permitted,\textsuperscript{66} as opposed to the niqab or other forms of garment hindering efficient procedures of identification.

\section*{12\ Publications and Media}

Some Muslim organisations are issuing magazines and brochures on religious issues and are maintaining websites (see section 3 above). Most of them only reach a rather limited number of readers. The \textit{Islamische Zeitung} is the only monthly journal. Besides that, some newspapers address the Turkish Muslim community, in particular \textit{Zaman}, which regularly deals with religious topics and is related to the Fethullah Gülen movement.

\textsuperscript{63} Judgement from 16 December 2008, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2009, p. 1289.

\textsuperscript{64} Cf. Federal Labour Court, judgement from 20.08.2009 (2 AZR 499/08); Administrative Court of Cologne, decision from 17.11.2008 (3 K 2630/07).

\textsuperscript{65} The author was one of the six experts invited; cf. www.bundestag.de/presse/hib/2010_10/2010_349/03.html, accessed 30 April 2012.

Besides that, there is an increasingly lively scene of publications and internet fora developing, aimed particularly at youths and their culture (e.g. ufuq.de) or women, like the magazines Gazelle (ed. Sineb El Masrar)\(^67\) or Imra’ah (ed. Sandra Adeoye).\(^68\)

In German public TV and broadcast, fora like the Wort zum Freitag (“word for Friday”, as a parallel to the Christian “word for Sunday”), the Forum am Freitag and the Das islamische Wort were established to enable authentic Muslim voices to be heard by a broader public. There are no specific Muslim-run TV or broadcast offers. Many Muslims would still use media of the countries of origin besides German media or alone, particularly Arab and Turkish sources.\(^69\)

The German Islam Conference provides some information in English in its magazine Muslims in Germany.\(^70\)

On a scientifijic level, new journals have been issued by Muslim scholars at some of the universities specialised in Islamic religious studies. The University of Erlangen-Nürnberg has had an internet publication called Zeitschrift für die Religionslehre des Islam (ZRLI) since 2007.\(^71\) At the University of Osnabrück, a print journal called Hikma—Journal of Islamic Theology and Religious Education has been published since 2010.\(^72\)

13 \hspace{1em} **FAMILY LAW**\(^73\)

Islamic norms (as formulated in the laws of Islamic states) are primarily applicable according to the rules of private international law (PIL) within

\(^{67}\) Website available at www.gazelle-magazin.de/, accessed 29 April 2012.


\(^{69}\) Representative data are available for migrants of Turkish background, but not specifically regarding the religious affiliation of the users or the media contents; cf. the working paper of the Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, *Mediennutzung von Migranten in Deutschland*, Nürnberg August 2010, pp. 24 s., available at www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Publikationen/WorkingPapers/wp34-mediennutzung-von-migranten.pdf?__blob=publicationFile, accessed 9 January 2013.


\(^{73}\) An overview in English on the application of Islamic norms in Germany is given by the author on the website of the German Islam Conference, available at www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/DIK/EN/Magazin/Recht/islam-recht-node.html, accessed 23 December 2012.
the limits set by public policy (Art. 6 EGBGB). In family matters, German PIL still uses citizenship as the main connecting factor, obliging courts and administrations to apply foreign law to “foreigners” living in Germany even after several generations. Thus, in Germany it is much more often necessary to apply foreign norms than in other European states following the principles of immigration countries, which usually prefer residence as the main connecting factor. This is fundamentally changing for important aspects of PIL: in 2012, the EU regulations on divorce (Regulation No 1259/2010) and on succession (Regulation No 650/2012) came into force, which declare residence to be the prime connecting factor. In practice, public policy would lead to the non-application of Islamic legal norms in a considerable number of cases to the extent that they preserve traditional gender inequality and the inequality of religions. According to the German system, these norms are not considered in the abstract, and it is only the result of their application in the concrete case which is taken into consideration. Thus, if this result were similar to the legal solution the German substantive law provides, the foreign norm can be applied. In addition to that, the application of public policy requires strong factual relations of the case to be decided in Germany.

Little information is available on the informal sector. Some mosques offer mediation in family conflicts. The Islamic centre of Munich seems to offer further (semi-legal) services concerning marriage and divorce. In a couple of cases Muslim refugees from Iraq who were unable to procure the necessary documents for an official marriage from their home country resorted to merely religious marriages concluded by imams. These marriages are without any legal standing in Germany, but can cause problems if they are socially binding within a marginalised community. Thus, some improvisation is required in cases where such “wives” seek a divorce which cannot be granted by courts due to the lack of a legally valid marriage. In 2012, the Bavarian Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection set up a working group dealing with the scope and limits of informal and formal Alternative Dispute resolution (ADR) outside state courts. It was

75 Court of Appeals München FamRZ 2013, 36 concerning an Iranian-German inheritance case.
76 Cf. the information given at www.islamisches-zentrum-muenchen.de/html/services_-_eheschliessungen.html, accessed 30 April 2012.
77 Two units were working on monitoring/practical administrative measures and preventive measures, the latter chaired by the author.
not specifically aimed at Muslim ADR, which seems to be rare outside some specific milieus, but at all kinds of groups who are keeping their distance from state institutions for various reasons (sometimes the motives are to be found among these groups, while at other times from within state institutions themselves). Results will be published in 2013.

In 2010, a broad and often very simplifying debate on “Shari’a and the German Constitution” started as a consequence of the then President Wulff’s statement on Islam “belonging to Germany.” It has shown that vast parts of the population, including legally trained politicians, obviously do not know the existing framework dealing with these issues in nearly the same manner for more than 100 years.78

In May 2012, the German regional court of Cologne79 ruled that male circumcision in a particular case concerning a Muslim boy is punishable under German penal law, even if performed by medical standards of care. This decision went against a unanimous opinion in the judiciary80 so far, which held this procedure to be lawful. It was based on a short and poorly balanced reasoning, simply stating that the parents cannot validly consent to the harm caused to the child. The court made no attempt whatsoever to weigh up the parents’ motivation of integrating the child into a religious community according to their definition of the best welfare of the child with the (relatively minor) violation of the integrity of the child’s body. This decision was not binding beyond the specific case before them but nevertheless caused uproar in the Jewish and Muslim communities. It was rejected by most of the political parties and by leading politicians including the Chancellor who said that the country will certainly not turn into a “nation of comedians.”81 Legislation aimed at clarifying the permission for male circumcision to be performed according to medical standards

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80 According to German law of social welfare, the state even has to finance the costs of a decent celebration of the circumcision in case of need, cf. Administrative Court of Appeal Lüneburg FEVS 44, p. 465.

Interreligious relations between Muslims and the major churches are well established and intense. The Catholic and Protestant Churches have appointed commissioners for Islamic affairs on the federal level and within their regional entities; their academies regularly organise conferences and meetings for interreligious dialogue. The Roman Catholic Church has issued a paper supporting the establishment of mosques in general, which caused some opposition and even departures by members rejecting Islam. Interreligious festivals and mutual invitations are very common—but usually Muslims would invite Christians more often to their festivals than vice versa. In some parts of the churches there are anti-Islamic tendencies, in which Islam is perceived to be incompatible with the structure of a secular democratic state. Others would still feel more solidarity with Muslims in view of broad common convictions and interests and preservation of freedom of religion for everybody.

Several organisations on the federal, state and local level are involved in interreligious activities on a regular basis. The Koordinierungsrat des christlich-islamischen Dialogs e.V. (KCID, Auf der Weißburg 44, 35418 Buseck, Internet: www.kcid.de; E-Mail: info@kcid.de) is an umbrella organisation on the federal level; the Christlich-islamische Gesellschaft (CIG, Alte Wippenfürther Strasse 53, 51065 Köln, Internet: www.chrislages.de).

83 Cf. the lucid essay of Heiner Bielefeldt, UN special rapporteur for freedom of religion and belief teaching an the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg “Marginalisierung der Religionsfreiheit?”, available at www.polwiss.uni-erlangen.de/professuren/menschenrechte/UN%20Sonderberichterstatter/bielefeldt_beschneidungsurteil_vorabfassung.pdf (31 July 12), to be published.
84 Cf. e.g. the report “Gefährliche Untertöne”, Nürnberger Nachrichten 31 December 2012, p. 4.
de; E-Mail: info@chrislages.de) is its oldest member. The Interkultureller Rat organises the Deutsches Islamforum und Islamforen in den Ländern (Internet: www.interkultureller-rat.de/projekte/deutsches-islamforum-und-islamforen-in-den-laendern/, containing also contact information for the seven state fora; E-Mail: info@interkultureller-rat.de) on a federal and state levels.

There are only very few inter-religious activities including Muslims and Jews bilaterally or multilaterally, e.g. in the remarkable Frankfurt Council of Religions (Rat der Religionen) established in 2009. Obviously, the Palestine conflict largely overshadows attempts to come to terms in Germany. Nevertheless, some prominent Jewish voices defended Muslims against attacks on their rights to freedom of religion.

15 PUBLIC OPINION AND DEBATE

There are significant differences between official statements and widespread public opinion concerning Islam. Apart from some small right-wing and fundamentalist Christian extremist groups, all non-extremist political parties and state officials still stress the necessity of distinguishing between Islam as a religion and its political abuse. No anti-Muslim party of any political importance has emerged yet. Some of the right-wing parties openly declare to "safeguard" the rightist political spectrum against extremism. In this sense, Chancellor Merkel stressed in a public statement shortly after the former President's remarks on Islam being part of Germany now (supra n. 13) that "in Germany the Basic Law (sc.: the German Constitution) is dominant, not Shari'a." Factually, this is absolutely correct on the level of legal hierarchies. Nevertheless, the very same

85 Cf. www.rat-der-religionen.de/.
87 Cf. e.g. Alexander Dobrindt, Angela Merkel and Horst Seehofer in www.faz.net/s/Rub594835B672714A1DBC121534F010EE1/Doc~E2E5F9ACFEB264FA8BC09CD06708FA7FC~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html, accessed 30 April 2012.
Constitution allows and even demands to grant Muslims their religious rights defined by Shari’a rules; in addition, German Private international law leads to the application of Shari’a-based law to a certain extent.\footnote{Cf. the reaction of some scientists including the author in www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,722220,00.html, accessed 30 April 2012.} Thus, to a large extent German law and Shari’a rules are compatible rather than mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, the constitutional principles of equal rights and duties, including the protection of religious freedom, seem to be unknown or misunderstood among the broad public.

Besides that, in the course of a broader debate on the integration of migrants, Muslims are often perceived to be the “most problematic” group. In many cases social, cultural and religious issues are simply mixed up. Thus, access to the labour market can be infringed by prejudice, particularly regarding women wearing a head scarf.\footnote{Cf. the brochure by the Deutsche Islam Konferenz, \textit{Bessere Integration von Musliminnen und Muslimen in den Arbeitsmarkt}, 2. ed. Nürnberg April 2012, pp. 9, 15 ss. available at www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DIK/DE/Downloads/DokumentePlenum/dik-broschuere-pg-a-download.pdf?__blob=publicationFile, accessed 30 January 2013.} In general, the debate on Muslims is very often linked to security matters. Thus, a broad majority in Germany would perceive Islam as such to be backward, ill-prepared for the necessities of the 21st century and potentially violent. After the “Sarrazin debate” in 2010/2011 (see \textit{Yearbook} 2011), the Salafi movement and the criminal activities of some members, namely in Bonn and Solingen, has been in the focus of the debate in 2012. The Salafi organisation \textit{Millatu Ibrahim} was banned by the Federal Ministry of the Interior; others are under scrutiny.\footnote{Cf. only the report “Islamismus in Deutschland: Innenminister Friedrich verbietet Salafistenverein”, Spiegel online 14 June 2012, available at www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/salafisten-verbot-friedrich-verbietet-millatu-ibrahim-a-838592.html, accessed 30 December 2012.} On the other hand, there is still a lot of respect and mutual understanding between most Muslims and non-Muslims in daily life. Obviously the fear of Islam is much more abstract than related to concrete experiences. This is underlined by the fact that in Eastern Germany, where (except in the state of Berlin) only few Muslims live, the rejection is considerably more widespread than in regions of dense Muslim population. In 2011, a lucid work written by a prominent journalist (Patrick Bahnas, \textit{Die Panikmacher. Die deutsche Angst vor dem Islam}, München 2011, C.H. Beck) dealt intensely with some leading Islamophobic voices and their ideology.

In Baden-Württemberg representative polls among Germans (including those of migrant backgrounds) were conducted by the Ministry of Integra-
tion in 2012.\textsuperscript{92} Only a few questions referred to issues relating to Islam. Concerning the establishment of mosques (which is legal and even privileged under German construction law due to freedom of religion), 33% of the respondents with the lowest education level (Hauptschulabschluss) felt bothered by that, as compared to 21% of those having obtained a university degree. Regarding the Muslim headscarf, 42% of the non-religious respondents felt bothered by it (57% did not), compared with only 34/35% of Catholics and Protestants and 7% of Muslims who were bothered by it (65% of Catholics and Protestants and 93% of Muslims were not).\textsuperscript{93}

According to representative polls among Germans on the federal level in 2012,\textsuperscript{94} around 70% of the respondents attributed “fanaticism and radicalism” to Islam, and only 7% “openness and tolerance.” The formulation of these questions is equally popular and problematic, since it remains totally unclear whether they refer to concrete or abstract experiences and information concerning Islam worldwide or only in Germany. In a way, this reflects the broad vague feeling of unease towards Islam and the still widespread phenomenon of the “othering” of Muslims in German society as one of the major results of these polls, whereas concrete problems related to religious issues concerning Germany are rarely formulated.

16 Major Cultural Events

There is a rich religious and cultural Muslim life in several parts of Germany now. Many mosques use the holiday of 3 October (Unification day) as a “day of the open mosque” inviting the public for information about Islam. In the month of Ramadan and during ‘Id al-Adha, Muslim organisations often invite political and social representatives to join their celebrations. In recent years, senior political officials have started to send congratulation messages to Muslims for ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha and sometimes organise receptions for them. In some cities Muslims and representatives of other minority religions are invited together with their Christian colleagues to participate in celebrations on the occasion of the inauguration of public buildings.

\textsuperscript{92} Ministerium für Integration Baden-Württemberg, \textit{Gelebte Vielfalt}, 2. Ed. Stuttgart October 2012 (for methodology cf. p. 6 s.).

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., p. 24 s.